

## **New Perspectives on the Empowerment of Workers**

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### **German Journal of Human Resource Management (Zeitschrift für Personalforschung)**

Due date for paper submission (max. 8,500 words): September 15th 2016

Special Issue Editors:

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The *German Journal of Human Resource Management (GHRM)* is the highest ranked German journal covering research on all issues related to human resource management and is listed by the SSCI. The special issues published in English receive considerable attention both in Germany and abroad.

For some time, researchers of various fields have been discussing the question about the pros and cons of worker empowerment. Broadly defined, empowerment includes employee autonomy (i.e., increased delegation of decision rights on work-related issues) and employee involvement (i.e., increased granting of participation rights on work-related issues). In recent years, this question appears to undergo a renaissance which is at least partially driven by the rise in behavioral economic contributions or the efforts of a number of authors in economics and management to combine psychological issues with their respective approaches. For example, according to social psychology increased worker empowerment is assumed to boost worker performance via increased intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000) or reciprocal behavior (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958). Recent work in behavioral economics yields similar results (Delgaauw and Dur, 2008; Dur et al. 2010), while standard economic literature hints to a trade-off of delegating decision and participation rights to subordinate agents. On the one hand, worker empowerment may raise performance via increased worker motivation. On the other hand, empowerment may also reduce worker performance, because workers have an incentive to abuse their increased authority at the expense of the employer (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Aghion et al., 2013; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011).

We would like to invite researchers to submit both theoretical and empirical contributions that address questions such as:

- Why do firms delegate decision rights to workers and let them participate in firm decisions?
- What distinguishes empowered workers from other less authorized and involved employees?

- Do workers benefit from being empowered (e.g., concerning job satisfaction, wage, work-life balance etc.)?
- Does worker empowerment boost worker and/or firm performance?
- What are the dark sides of worker autonomy and involvement (e.g., shirking, work intensification, health problems etc.)?

Papers should deal with the issues in a powerful and compelling way, contributing to international research. The above list is by no means exhaustive, and other papers are of course welcome and encouraged by the guest editors if they include worker autonomy or involvement as central variables.

### Submissions

In order to be considered for publication in the special issue, authors should submit their full paper with a maximum of 8,500 words by September 15th 2016. The full paper must be written in English. Submitted papers must also be unpublished and not submitted to other journals. All submissions will undergo a double-blind review process. The authors will receive feedback and an editorial decision (acceptance, invitation to revise and resubmit the paper, rejection) until January 15th 2017. Revised papers should be resubmitted until April 15th 2017. The final decision upon acceptance or rejection of the paper can be expected until June 15th 2017. Finalized papers are due until July 15th 2017 and will be published in the *German Journal of Human Resource Management* 31 (4) issue.

Formal guidelines for accepted papers are available at

<http://www.zfp-personalforschung.de/pmwiki.php/Main/AuthorsGuidelines>.

Please send your full paper in pdf format electronically to [michael.beckmann@unibas.ch](mailto:michael.beckmann@unibas.ch).

### Agenda

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<b>Due date for full paper submission (8,500 words):</b>	September 15th 2016
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<b>Due date for revised and resubmitted papers:</b>	April 15th 2017
<b>Due date for final editorial decision:</b>	June 15th 2017
<b>Due date for finalized papers:</b>	July 15th 2017

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